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Executive control, the ability to plan one’s behaviour to achieve a goal, is a hallmark of frontal lobe function in humans
and other primates. In the current study we report neural correlates of executive control in the avian nidopallium
caudolaterale, a region analogous to the mammalian prefrontal cortex. Homing pigeons (Columba livia) performed a
working memory task in which cues instructed them whether stimuli should be remembered or forgotten. When
instructed to remember, many neurons showed sustained activation throughout the memory period. When instructed
to forget, the sustained activation was abolished. Consistent with the neural data, the behavioural data showed that
memory performance was high after instructions to remember, and dropped to chance after instructions to forget. Our
findings indicate that neurons in the avian nidopallium caudolaterale participate in one of the core forms of executive
control, the control of what should be remembered and what should be forgotten. This form of executive control is
fundamental not only to working memory, but also to all cognition.
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Introduction
In 1861, Paul Broca [1] proclaimed that the ‘‘majesty of the
human’’ could be attributed to its superior faculties, such as
abstraction and judgement, and that these superior faculties
lie within the province of the ‘‘anterior lobes of the brain.’’
Today the picture has changed little, and the frontal lobes, in
particular the prefrontal cortex (PFC), are viewed as the
repository of a host of higher-order faculties such as control
of action, temporal organization of behaviour, sequencing,
goal-directed behaviour, abstract and conceptual thinking,
creativity, reasoning, and cognitive ﬂexibility, to name a few
[2–5]. Often these faculties are subsumed under two broad
headings that deﬁne PFC function: working memory and
executive control.
There is ample evidence that the PFC is important for both
working memory, the ability to store information for short
periods of time, and executive control, processes that operate
on the contents of stored information. With respect to
working memory, numerous studies in humans have shown
that the PFC is activated during tasks that require retention
of information [4,6,7]. Similarly, studies with monkeys have
shown that certain neurons in the PFC display increased and
sustained activation during the retention period of working
memory tasks [8–11]. This sustained activation, also com-
monly referred to as delay activity because it occurs during
the delay (memory) portion of a working memory task, is
believed to represent a neural correlate of working memory
[12–16].
In contrast to the evidence regarding the PFC and working
memory, the evidence that the PFC is involved in executive
control processes is considerably more varied in nature. In
humans, tasks that require conﬂict resolution, that is, tasks
that pit attending to task-relevant information and inhibiting
task-irrelevant information, such as the Stroop Interference
test or the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, result in activation
of the frontal cortex [17,18]. In monkeys, ﬁndings that PFC
neurons are robust to distracting events [11], are modulated
by attentional demands [19], encode abstract rules [20], and
integrate information across different senses [21–23] have all
been taken as evidence for its role in executive control
processes.
Part of the reason for the varied evidence for executive
control processes in both human and monkey studies is that
the term executive control is itself somewhat poorly deﬁned [24].
While the taxonomy of executive control still remains vague,
some have argued that of all the processes that fall under the
rubric of executive control, one of the fundamental processes
is the ability to selectively remember relevant information
and discard irrelevant information [18]. This seems reason-
able, for although our memory capacity is impressive, it is not
limitless [19,25,26], and we must possess and engage mecha-
nisms that allow us to selectively ﬁlter information. In the
current study, we provide evidence for neural correlates of
this fundamental form of executive control in the avian brain.
We recorded from the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) of
homing pigeons. On the basis of behavioural/lesion [27,28],
neurochemical [29], and anatomical [30,31] studies, the NCL
is considered, much like the PFC for mammals, to be the main
integrative and executive area of the avian brain. The pigeons
were trained on a directed forgetting [32,33] version of the
delayed matching-to-sample task, a standard test of working
memory used across a number of species, including birds,
rats, monkeys, and humans. The birds were ﬁrst shown a
sample stimulus and then presented with either a remember
cue or a forget cue (Figure 1A and 1B; see Materials and
Methods). Following the remember or forget cue was a delay
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function of whether the remember cue or the forget cue had
been presented. If the remember cue was presented, then the
delay was followed by a test period in which two stimuli were
displayed, and a response to the stimulus that had appeared
as the sample was rewarded. On the other hand, if the forget
cue was presented, then following the delay there was no test
period, and the trial terminated. Effectively, the remember
cue instructed the bird that its memory for the sample would
be tested after the delay and that it should therefore
remember the sample stimulus, whereas the forget cue
instructed the bird that there would be no test following
the delay, and hence that it could forget the sample stimulus.
Whether the cues were indeed instructing the birds to
remember and forget the sample stimulus was tested with
forget-probe trials (Figure 1C), which will be discussed
shortly.
To the extent that sustained activation is a neural correlate
of memory, and that the avian NCL is involved in executive
control processes, we predicted that the activity of NCL
neurons would be sensitive to cues to remember and forget.
We found that neurons in the avian NCL showed sustained
activation when the subject was instructed to remember, and
the sustained activation was abolished when the subject was
instructed to forget. Our ﬁndings indicate that neurons in the
avian NCL participate in one of the fundamental forms of
executive control, the control of what should be remembered
and what should be forgotten.
Results
Histology
In two birds we recorded from both left and right NCL. For
the three remaining birds, units were only recorded from
either the left or right NCL. We recorded from a total of 124
NCL neurons. Figure 2 shows the electrode track reconstruc-
tions for the ﬁve subjects. With respect to the placements of
the electrodes, the tracks were within the boundaries of NCL
as deﬁned by Kro ¨ner and Gu ¨ntu ¨rku ¨n [31]. All tracks were
within 0.75 mm of the desired AP þ 5.5 location (range AP þ
5.25 to AP þ 6.25), and all tracks were within 0.5 mm to the
desired ML 6 7.5 location (range ML 6 7.0 to ML 6 8.0). We
found no evidence that the characteristics of the neurons
differed between the left and right hemispheres, along the
dorsal and ventral extent of the NCL, or from one bird to the
other. We have therefore collapsed the results across these
variables.
Incidence and Type of Delay Activity
A neuron was deﬁned as a delay neuron if the level of
activity during the delay period, when memory was required,
was signiﬁcantly different from the level of activity during the
intertrial interval period, when memory was not required
(paired t-test, see Materials and Methods, Data analysis). Of
the 124 NCL cells, 83 (66.9%) were classiﬁed as delay neurons.
For 30 of the 83 cells, delay activity occurred after only one of
the two to-be-remembered (sample) stimuli used on the
memory task; these cells therefore contributed one instance
each of delay activity for subsequent analysis. The remaining
53 cells exhibited delay activity after both of the to-be-
remembered stimuli; these cells therefore contributed two
instances each of delay activity for subsequent analysis. In all,
across the 83 delay cells there was a total of 136 instances of
delay activity.
Modulation of Delay Activity by Remember and Forget
Cues
What effect did the remember and forget cues have on
delay activity? In 120 of the 136 (88.2%) instances of delay
activity, sustained activation was found only on remember
trials, when memory was needed to solve the task. On forget
trials, when no memory was required, the sustained activation
was abolished. Examples of three neurons that exhibit this
effect are shown in Figure 3. In each case, the remember cue
was followed by a high level of activity that persisted beyond
the cue period into and throughout the delay period. In
contrast, the forget cue triggered an immediate decrease in
activity during the cue period to intertrial interval (baseline)
levels, and this decrease in activity persisted throughout the
delay period. In short, following instructions to remember
the sample stimulus, the cells exhibited sustained activation
throughout the cue and delay periods, whereas following
instructions to forget the sample stimulus, the sustained
activation was abolished. Again, this effect was observed in
the vast majority of instances of delay activity. Note that the
pattern of data is not affected if we average the delay activity
across the two sample stimuli and think of each cell as
contributing only one instance of delay activity. In this case,
of the 83 delay neurons, 63 (75.9%) showed the effect, that is,
sustained activation on remember trials but not on forget
trials.
Population Response
Delay activity was further classiﬁed as excitatory or
inhibitory, referring to an increase or decrease in activity
relative to intertrial interval levels. Of the 83 delay neurons,
22 were inhibitory (10 contributing one instance of delay
activity and 12 contributing two instances of delay activity)
and 61 were excitatory (20 contributing one instance of delay
activity and 41 contributing two instances of delay activity).
In total, across the 136 instances of delay activity we
encountered 102 instances of excitatory delay activity and
34 instances of inhibitory delay activity. The average response
proﬁle across all 102 instances of excitatory delay activity is
shown in Figure 4. After a brief response to the remember
cue, the population maintained high levels of activity for the
Figure 1. Behavioural Task
Sequence of events on (A) remember trials, (B) forget trials, and (C)
forget-probe trials. On remember and forget-probe trials the birds
were presented with a test period, whereas on forget trials the test
period was absent. The three horizontally arranged circles represent
the projectors on which the stimuli, in this case a circle and dot, were
displayed. During the cue and delay periods, the projectors were
turned off. ITI, intertrial interval; R, remember cue, a high-frequency
tone; F, forget cue, a low-frequency tone.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030190.g001
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the response to the forget cue was followed by a drop in
activity to baseline levels in the cue period, which persisted
into the delay period. A repeated-measures ANOVA applied
to all 102 instances of excitatory delay activity, with cue
(remember vs. forget) and bins (100, 6, 40, and 60 bins of 50
ms in the intertrial interval, sample, cue, and delay periods,
respectively) as factors, with repeated measures over bins,
conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant difference in activity between
remember and forget trials during the cue period, F(1, 202)
= 24.3, p , 0.001, and the delay period, F(1, 202) = 16.4, p ,
0.001, but not during the intertrial interval period, F(1, 202)
= 0.07, p = 0.80, and sample period, F(1, 202) = 0.25, p =
0.62. A signiﬁcant difference in activity in the delay period
following remember and forget cues was also observed for the
34 instances of inhibitory delay activity, F(1, 66) = 5.4, p ,
0.05. In these cases of inhibitory delay activity, the activity
remained depressed after the remember cue, but was elevated
to baseline levels after the forget cue.
Behavioural Evidence of Forgetting
If sustained activation represents a neural correlate of
active remembering, then the lack of such activity after the
instruction to forget must be a neural correlate of active
forgetting. The forget cue, however, acquires its function
because it predicts the absence of the test period. If the birds
are not tested after the forget cue, then how is it possible to
know that the forget cue has directed them to forget the
sample stimulus? We examined this issue by testing the birds
occasionally with probe trials in which, against its prediction,
the forget cue was followed by a test period. An example of
such a forget-probe trial is shown in Figure 1C (see Materials
and Methods). The birds were tested only rarely with these
forget-probe trials. The reason for not testing more often
with forget-probe trials is that, if we had done so, the ability
of the forget cue to predict the absence of a test period would
have been jeopardized.
Figure 2. Histology
(A) Lateral view of the pigeon brain. The NCL is shaded in red. The black line represents the intended electrode trajectory.
(B) Histological reconstruction of the electrode tracks for the ﬁve pigeons. The NCL is shaded in red. The black lines represent the electrode
track. All tracks were within the boundaries of the NCL. APH, area parahippocampalis; CDL, area corticoidea dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus;
NC, nidopallium caudale; SGC, stratum griseum centrale; TrO: tractus opticus; V: ventricle.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030190.g002
Figure 3. Modulation by Remember and Forget Cues
Examples of remember and forget cues modulating neural activity in
three delay neurons from three different birds. The cue and delay
periods are shaded in grey. On remember trials, there is sustained
activation in the cue and delay periods. On forget trials, the sustained
activation is abolished. The binwidth is 50 ms. The vertical dashed
lines separate the different periods of the task. ITI, intertrial interval;
S, sample period.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030190.g003
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in Figure 5A. On every one of the sessions, performance on
the forget-probe trials was lower than performance on the
remember trials. Figure 5B shows the performance on
remember and forget-probe trials averaged across the four
birds that were tested with probe trials. The average
performance after the forget cue (43.8%) was signiﬁcantly
lower than the average performance after the remember cue
(78.5%), t(3) = 3.31, p , 0.05. In addition, a one-sample t-test
evaluated against 50% indicated that performance on forget-
probe trials was not signiﬁcantly different from chance, t(3)
= 1.00, p = 0.39. The chance levels of performance on forget-
probe trials indicates that the forget cue is indeed directing
the subject to forget the sample stimulus, a ﬁnding in line




To summarize our ﬁndings, approximately 67% of the
neurons we sampled in the NCL exhibited sustained
activation during the delay period of the working memory
task when the animal was required to engage memory
processes. For the vast majority (88%) of the instances of
delay activity, the sustained activation was modulated by
instructions to either remember or forget. Instructions to
remember resulted in sustained activation during the cue and
delay portions of the memory task. In contrast, following
instructions to forget, the sustained activation was rapidly
abolished, and the neural activity returned to baseline levels.
The high levels of performance following remember trials
conﬁrmed that the remember cue was directing the subject to
remember the sample stimulus. In addition, the chance levels
of performance on the forget-probe trials, in which the birds
were cued to forget but then actually given a retention test,
conﬁrmed that the forget cue was directing the subject to
forget the sample stimulus.
Significance of Current Findings
The neurons in our study ﬁred when the birds were told to
remember, and they stopped ﬁring when the birds were told
to forget. We conclude that neurons in the avian NCL
participate in one of the fundamental forms of executive
control, the control of what should be remembered and what
should be forgotten. Naturally, it is hard to know whether it is
the NCL neurons that are performing the executive control
function, or whether we are observing the effects on NCL
neurons of executive functions that lie elsewhere in the brain.
Given the evidence that we will review shortly that NCL may
be an analogue of the mammalian PFC, and given the role of
the PFC in executive control, we believe the former is the
more likely case. This cause-and-effect issue aside, the need
for such a ﬁltering mechanism should be obvious. Although
our memory capacity is impressive, it is not limitless
[19,25,26]. We must have the ability, therefore, to ﬁlter
information, allowing access to memory or retaining in
memory that which is relevant, while restricting access to
memory or discarding from memory that which is not.
Our data are the ﬁrst example of neural correlates of
executive control in a nonmammalian species. We would also
argue that they are the most straightforward example of
neural correlates of executive control reported in any species
thus far. Using a delayed matching-to-sample task in which
monkeys were cued to attend to certain visual information in
an array of visually presented stimuli, Rainer et al. [19] found
that the delay activity of PFC neurons was dominated by
information from the attended rather than the unattended
target. On the basis of these ﬁndings they concluded that ‘‘we
hold in working memory that to which we attend’’ (p. 578).
We take these ﬁndings one step further by showing that even
after attending to a stimulus we can still make the executive
decision to allow information to remain in working memory,
or to discard that information from working memory. Our
ﬁndings show that remembering and forgetting are both well
controlled and active processes that can be engaged and
disengaged at any time [16,34].
Avian NCL and Mammalian PFC: Homologue or Analogue?
The NCL is a multimodal telencephalic region located in
the posterior forebrain of birds. Divac and colleagues [28,29]
were the ﬁrst to suggest that the avian NCL might correspond
to the mammalian PFC. Naturally, given almost 320 million
years of independent evolution [35], there are some differ-
ences between the two structures. Most notably, the NCL is
neither cortex nor in the frontal (i.e., anterior) part of the
Figure 5. Performance on Probe Trial Sessions
(A) The performance on each of the eight sessions with forget-probe
trials.
(B) The performance on the probe sessions (61 SE) averaged across
all four birds. The dotted line represents chance levels of perform-
ance.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030190.g005
Figure 4. The Response Profile of Excitatory Delay Neurons
The response proﬁle of all 102 instances of excitatory delay activity
on remember and forget trials. To account for differences in ﬁring
rates between the neurons, each neuron’s ﬁring rate was normalized
against its baseline ﬁring rate. The cue and the delay periods are
shaded in grey. The vertical dashed lines separate the different
periods of the task. ITI, intertrial interval; S, sample period.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030190.g004
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comparing structures [36]. Although the NCL and PFC are
not homologous structures [36], the evidence we review below
does suggest that they are analogous structures.
Both NCL and PFC are ideally situated to integrate sensory
information and translate that information into action.
Anatomically, the NCL and PFC have similar patterns of
afferent and efferent connections [31]. Both receive projec-
tions from modality-speciﬁc secondary visual, auditory, and
somatosensory areas [31,37–39], and both project to motor
and limbic areas of the brain [31,37]. In addition, both the
NCL and PFC receive dense dopaminergic innervation from
midbrain structures [29,40,41].
There are, of course, anatomical differences between the
NCL and the PFC. One of the hallmark characteristics of PFC
in primates is that it receives projections from the medi-
odorsal (MD) nucleus of the thalamus [42,43]. In birds, the
main thalamic projection to the NCL is the nucleus
dorsolateralis posterior thalami (DLP) [44]. The DLP, how-
ever, is not generally considered homologous to the MD, nor
is it identical to the MD in all of its connections [27].
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the DLP may serve the
same functions as the MD [27], and that therefore the DLP–
NCL system may be analogous to the MD–PFC system.
There is also considerable behavioural/lesion data to
support the contention that NCL and PFC perform similar
functions. Damage to the NCL and PFC results in impair-
ments on delayed alternation and pattern-reversal tasks while
having little or no effect on simultaneous visual discrim-
inations and basic sensory processes [2,27,28,45–47]. In
addition, blockade of D1 receptors in NCL and PFC both
cause impairments on tasks sensitive to PFC and NCL damage
[48–50]. Finally, the response proﬁles of NCL neurons are
similar to those found in PFC [51,52]. In summary, despite the
anatomical and functional differences, which are not limited
to comparisons between birds and mammals, but also include
comparisons between one mammal and another [53], we
believe there is considerable evidence to support the view
that the avian NCL is analogous to the mammalian PFC.
What Is Being Coded by Delay Activity?
Early studies of delay activity tended to be of the view that
it represented a neural correlate of the to-be-remembered
sample stimulus [12–14]. We have cast our ﬁndings along
similar lines, and viewed the presence and absence of delay
activity on remember and forget trials as neural correlates of
the birds’ remembering and forgetting the sample stimulus.
The view that delay activity represents memory of the sample
stimulus, however, has not gone unchallenged [54–57].
Recently, Lebedev et al. [58] have provided compelling
evidence that delay activity, at least in PFC, represents more
than just ‘‘maintenance memory.’’ By pitting attention and
memory against each other, they reported that PFC delay
activity more likely represents the location that the subject
was attending to, rather than the location that the subject was
remembering.
It is important to bear in mind that although we discuss our
delay activity in terms of the subjects’ remembering and
forgetting the sample stimulus, there are other, equally likely,
interpretations of the delay activity. For example, the
remember and forget cues are also informing the subject
about the prospect of obtaining a reward [59]: the remember
cue tells the subject that there is the opportunity for a reward
(assuming a correct response is made), and the forget cue tells
the subject that no reward is forthcoming. The presence of
sustained activation during remember trials, and the lack of
such activity on forget trials, could therefore also reﬂect the
neuron’s coding for the possibility of a reward, and the
absence of a reward, respectively. Similarly, along the lines
suggested by Lebedev et al. [58], the remember and forget
cues could also be informing the subject about where to
direct attention in the chamber. Thus the presence and
absence of sustained activation on remember and forget trials
could therefore also represent a neural correlate of the
subject attending to the spatial position where the choice
stimuli will appear, and not attending to any particular
spatial location, respectively.
The fact that sustained activation may serve as a code for
the sample stimulus [52], aspects of the impending reward
[60–62], or spatial attention [58] raises another important
issue about PFC function. Many studies show that it is a
combination of features that activate PFC neurons [61,62], a
ﬁnding that may not be too surprising, given the known
multimodal nature of the PFC [37,63], and a point that ﬁts
well with the established view that memory consists of a
collection of attributes [64,65]. The point we are trying to
emphasize is that even though delay activity correlates with
aspects of the reward, attentional factors, and the memo-
randum, this does not weaken the notion that delay activity is
a neural correlate of working memory, nor does it weaken the
notion that the remember and forget cues are modulating the
contents of working memory.
Against this backdrop of PFC neurons coding for attributes
of working memory other than the sample stimulus, it might
be interesting to speculate on our observation that the
majority of NCL delay activity was nonselective in that it
tended to occur after both (63.9%) rather than just one
(36.1%) of the stimuli used on the memory task. A similar
preponderance of nonselective delay activity has been
observed in the hippocampus [15], which like the PFC, is
also a zone of multimodal convergence in the brain [37]. In
contrast, the majority of delay activity in the inferior
temporal cortex, a higher-order area of the primate brain
dedicated exclusively to visual processing, is selective, in that
it tends to occur after only one rather than both of the stimuli
used on the memory task [15]. It may be the case that delay
activity in modality-speciﬁc visual areas may reﬂect more a
code of the sample stimulus, whereas delay activity in
multimodal areas like the PFC and NCL may reﬂect the
other attributes of working memory, such as spatial attention
and reward anticipation.
The Value of Comparative Research
Is it necessary to invoke higher-order executive control
mechanisms to explain the behaviour of pigeons in the
current study? And in doing so, have we not dispensed with
Occam’s razor? We understand that it might be uncomfort-
able for some to accept that pigeons have executive control
mechanisms. But if studies of animal cognition have shown us
anything it is that behaviours once thought to be the exclusive
domain of humans can be seen in many nonhuman (and
nonmammalian) species [66]. The often heard retort to these
examples of cognitive equivalencies is that just because you
can mimic the behaviour of one species in another does not
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same mechanism. While true, the fact that you can get a bird
to exhibit behaviour like that of a human could just as easily
make us question how humans are solving the task, as make us
question how birds are solving the task. The bottom line is
that one would be hard pressed to argue against the view of
mental continuity across species [66], and so if we accept
executive processes in humans, it is very likely that executive
processes exist in nonmammalian species as well.
What then are the implications of showing neural
correlates of executive control in the avian brain? For one,
it would appear that the ability to ﬁlter relevant and
irrelevant information, what some have argued is a funda-
mental form of executive control [18], is clearly not an
exclusive feature of the mammalian brain. However, we
believe our data speak to another issue, one that emphasizes
the importance of conducting comparative work. There is
little doubt that it is commonplace to richly interpret human
behaviour. But when you show that a pigeon can recognize
itself in a mirror [67], or that a crow can manufacture a tool
[68], it is not just an interesting demonstration, but it also
constrains and reﬁnes our views regarding the neural
mechanisms that underlie such behaviour. When you show
that the avian hippocampus is in every respect an analogue of
the mammalian hippocampus [69], yet at the same time
structurally totally different [70], it is not just idle curiosity,
but it also requires that we take this into consideration when
we devise computational models of hippocampal function.
And when you show that neurons in the avian brain engage in
executive control processes, one must then wonder how much
of what makes us such majestic creatures is present in an
organism whose behaviour rarely inspires the attribution of
high cognitive skills.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. The subjects were 5 homing pigeons (Columba livia)
weighing approximately 400–650 g. The animals were housed
individually in wire-mesh cages inside a colony room, had free access
to water and grit, and were maintained on a 12:12-h light:dark cycle
with lights on at 0700. The pigeons were fed a mixture of wheat, peas,
and corn in an amount adjusted to maintain them at 80% of their
free-feeding body weight. The experiments were approved by the
University of Otago Animal Ethics Committee and conducted in
accordance with the University of Otago’s Code of Ethical Conduct
for the Manipulation of Animals.
Apparatus and stimuli. All training and testing was conducted in
standard sound attenuated operant chambers. Situated on the front
panel of each chamber were three horizontally-arranged clear plastic
circular response keys, each 2.5 cm in diameter. All three keys were
mounted 22 cm above the ﬂoor and were 10 cm apart from centre to
centre. Situated behind each key was a stimulus projector (IEE model
1071; Institution of Electrical Engineers, London, United Kingdom)
used to deliver the visual stimuli. Food reward (wheat) was delivered
via an illuminated magazine situated below the centre key. The
stimuli consisted of standard geometric shapes (circle and dot) and
two colours (red and white). The geometric shapes appeared as white
forms against a black background. The circle was composed of a line
that was 1.5 mm thick and was 17 mm in diameter, whereas the dot
was solid and 7 mm in diameter. The colour stimuli consisted of
illumination of the entire 25-mm diameter response key with the
colour red or white. The presentation of the stimuli, reward, and
punishment contingencies, and all data recording were controlled by
Pentium II computers attached to the chamber.
Behavioural task. The birds were trained on a directed forgetting
version of the delayed matching-to-sample task. The sequence of
events on a typical trial is shown in Figure 1. Each bird was trained
with two stimuli, either a circle and a dot, or the colours red and
white. All trials began with a 15-s intertrial interval, followed by the
sample period, during which one of two stimuli was displayed on the
centre of three keys. Following three pecks to the sample stimulus,
the sample was turned off. This was followed by a cue period in which
either the remember or forget cue was presented for 2 s. A delay
period of 3 s followed the cue period. If the remember cue had been
presented (Figure 1A), the delay was followed by a test period in
which both stimuli were displayed. A single response to the stimulus
that had been presented in the sample period was rewarded with
wheat, whereas a single response to the other stimulus was punished
with a 30-s time-out. If the forget cue had been presented (Figure 1B),
the trial ended after the delay period without a test period.
A session consisted of 96 trials, 48 remember trials and 48 forget
trials, randomly mixed. With two stimuli (A and B), there are four
possible trial types: sample A can be followed by A on the left and B
on the right, or B on the left and A on the right, likewise for sample B.
Which of the two stimuli (e.g., A or B) was presented during the
sample period, the position of the two stimuli on the side keys during
the test period (e.g., A B or B A), as well as the sequence of remember
and forget cues, was balanced within a session. For different birds, the
remember and forget cues were either a high-frequency tone (5,000
Hz) and a low-frequency tone (500 Hz), or a four-lobed visual pattern
(two ﬁgure eights superimposed on each other) and a 16-lobed visual
pattern (resembling a sun). The four-lobed and 16-lobed patterns
appeared as white shapes against a black background and were each
17 mm in diameter.
Approximately after every 15th recording session the birds were
tested with forget-probe trials (Figure 1C). These forget-probe trials
were administered to four of the ﬁve birds; bird T18 did not receive a
probe trial session because we lost the ability to record from this bird
after the 11th recording session. These probe trials allowed us to
examine the effectiveness of the forget cue as an instruction to forget
the sample stimulus. Recall that on standard forget trials, following
the delay period there was no test period, so it is impossible to know
whether the subject had indeed forgotten the sample stimulus. On a
forget-probe trial, against its usual prediction, the forget cue was
followed by a test period. A probe trial session contained four forget-
probe trials in addition to the 48 remember and 48 forget trials. All
aspects of the stimulus and cue presentations were balanced within a
session.
Training protocol. Although all of the birds had been trained on a
simultaneous matching-to-sample task, none had received any
delayed matching-to-sample experience at the start of this experi-
ment. Delayed matching-to-sample training was divided into two
phases. In phase 1, the birds were ﬁrst trained with a 0-s delay
followed by training with a 0.5-s delay. The birds were required to
achieve a performance level of two consecutive sessions at or better
than 90% correct at each delay. To complete phase 1 the birds
required an average of 43 sessions (range 24–63 sessions) and
accumulated an average of 1,987 trials (range 1,297–3,264 trials).
In phase 2 the birds were introduced to the directed forgetting
procedure, which used the same delayed matching-to-sample task but
with remember and forget cues. The birds were gradually trained
with increasing delays and increasing session lengths until they were
able to perform the task with a 5-s delay (2-s cue period and 3-s delay
period) and 96 trials per session. To complete phase 2 the birds
required an average of 214 sessions (range 148–236 sessions) and
accumulated an average of 14,545 trials (range 11,088–16,268 trials)
on the task. Note that half of the trials accumulated during phase 2
were forget trials.
Surgery. Upon completion of behavioural training, the birds were
prepared for alert recording by implanting a miniature movable
microdrive [71]. Surgery was conducted under ketamine (225 mg/kg)
and xylazine (5 mg/kg) anaesthesia. The head was immobilized using a
Revzin stereotaxic adapter [72]. A topical anaesthetic (10% Xylo-
caine) was applied to the scalp, which was then cut and retracted to
expose the skull. A small hole above the NCL was drilled through the
skull at APþ5.5 and ML 6 7.5 [72], and the microdrive then lowered
so that the tips of the electrodes were positioned just above the NCL.
Stainless steel skull screws, one serving as a ground screw, were placed
into the skull, and the entire microdrive was attached to the skull
using dental acrylic. The incision was then sutured, Xylocaine applied
to the wound margin, and the animal allowed to recover in a heated,
padded cage until alert and mobile, at which point it was returned to
its home cage. All animals were allowed to recover for 7–10 d prior to
the start of recording.
Neuronal recording. The microdrive housed eight 25-lm Formvar-
coated nichrome wires that were used to measure the extracellular
activity of single neurons. All signals were ﬁrst impedance matched
through a FET headstage and then ampliﬁed and ﬁltered to remove
50 Hz noise using Grass P511K preampliﬁers (Grass Instruments,
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minimal activity served as the indifferent electrode. The signals were
monitored with an oscilloscope and speaker. Behavioural time-
tagging of all events and analysis of the spike data was accomplished
using a CED 1401 plus system (Cambridge Electronic Design Limited,
Cambridge, United Kingdom) and CED Spike 2 software. The only
criterion for the selection of a neuron was that it was well isolated
with a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 2:1. After isolating a neuron, the
delayed matching-to-sample task was started. A typical session lasted
approximately 45 m to 1 h. The pigeons were tested once a day. At the
end of the recording session, the electrodes were advanced at least 40
lm and the animal returned to its home cage.
Histology and electrode track reconstruction. Upon completion of
the experiment, the ﬁnal electrode position was marked by passing a
current through each electrode, thus creating a small electrolytic
lesion.Thepigeonswerethendeeplyanaesthetisedwithhalothaneand
perfused through the heart with physiological saline followed by 10%
formalin. The brains were blocked, removed, placed in 10% formalin
for 5 d, placed in 30% sucrose and 10% formalin, and allowed to sink
twice. The brains were then frozen and sectioned at 50 lm, with every
section mounted and stained with cresyl violet. The positions of the
recorded neurons were calculated from the electrode track recon-
structions, position of the electrolytic lesion, and depth records.
Data analysis. Only correct trial data were analyzed. For initial
assessment of delay activity, for each neuron the average activity in
the middle 5 s of the intertrial interval was compared to the average
activity in the delay period after each of the two sample stimuli using
paired t-tests with a modiﬁed [73] Bonferroni correction (p , 0.025).
The population data were subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA
with Greenhouse–Geisser correction.
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